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Abstract
In this paper we present a macroeconomic microfounded framework with heterogen-
eous agents – individuals, firms, banks – which interact through a decentralized matching
process presenting common features across four markets – goods, labor, credit and de-
posit. We study the dynamics of the model by means of computer simulation. Some
macroeconomic properties emerge such as endogenous business cycles, nominal GDP
growth, unemployment rate fluctuations, the Phillips curve, leverage cycles and credit
constraints, bank defaults and financial instability, and the importance of government
as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy. The model highlights that even ex-
tended crises can endogenously emerge. In these cases, the system may remain trapped
in a large unemployment status, without the possibility to quickly recover unless an
exogenous intervention.
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1 Introduction
In recent years many economists have developed agent-based models to investigate the working
of a macroeconomic system composed of heterogeneous interacting entities (Tesfatsion and
Judd, 2006; LeBaron and Tesfatsion, 2008). In general, the idea is to start from simple
(adaptive) individual behavioral rules and interaction mechanisms and to simulate a model
in order to reproduce the emergence of aggregate regularities and endogenous crises. In a
sense, this is a generative approach according to which we construct the macroeconomy from
the “bottom-up” (Epstein and Axtell, 1996). In what follows, we report some examples of
agent-based models showing emergent macroeconomic features based on the interplay between
two fundamental characteristics of agent-based models: heterogeneity and interaction. We
also provide a discussion on early contributions, particularly in the field of microsimulation,
which provided the bases for future developments of heterogeneous interacting agent models.
Moreover, we describe the possible use of the agent-based methodology in order to assess the
role of different economic policies.
One of the basic characteristics of agent-based models is heterogeneity. Agents may differ
in many dimensions such as income, wealth, size, financial fragility, location, information,
and so on. One of the main advantages of considering agent heterogeneity is that aggreg-
ate regularities are not approximated by the behavior of a “representative agent” (Kirman,
1992; see also Gallegati and Kirman, 1999). The latter assumption, indeed, may lead to
some inconsistencies, for instance because real-world data are often not Gaussian distributed,
showing in many cases a power law shape. Consequently, it is usually not possible to reduce
the complexity of macroeconomic dynamics to the behavior of a single agent with an “av-
erage” behavior, because the average does not represent the behavior of the system. As a
consequence, macroeconomic models based on the representative agent hypothesis suffer from
a “fallacy of composition”. However, even in mainstream economic models it is possible to
introduce a certain degree of heterogeneity. For instance, the recent debate in the DSGE (Dy-
namic Stochastic General Equilibrium) models community is focused on the introduction of
financial factors and agents’ heterogeneity. However, another basic feature that can be hardly
introduced in mainstream models and that is instead at the root of agent-based models is the
“direct interaction” among heterogeneous agents.
As for the specific topic regarding the interaction among agents, earlier contributions are
based on a stochastic approach. Even in the case of stochastic interaction among individual
agents, aggregate regularities may emerge. Indeed, the aggregation of simple interactions at
the micro level can generate sophisticated behavior at the macro level. An early contribution
on this topic is the one proposed by Fo¨llmer (1974): he studies the dynamics of an exchange
economy with random preferences. By applying the physics tools from interacting particle
systems, Fo¨llmer (1974) shows that even weak interaction may propagate through the economy
and give rise to aggregate uncertainty causing large price movements and even a breakdown of
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price equilibria. Kirman (1991, 1993) proposes an analysis of the effects of local interactions in
an exchange model with fundamentalists and chartists; in particular, Kirman (1993) provides
an interesting analogy between biology and economics, focusing on the similarities between
the behavior of ants and the dynamics of financial markets. See Brock (1993) and Kirman
(1999) for a review of models with interacting agents. See also the reviews proposed by
Gallegati and Kirman (1999) and Delli Gatti et al. (2000).
However, agent-based macro modelling has a 50 years tradition and at least a seminal
paper can be cited, that is Orcutt (1957), which founded the microsimulation approach. “Mi-
crosimulation is a methodology used in a large variety of scientific fields to simulate the states
and behaviors of different units – e.g. individuals, households, firms – as they evolve in a
given environment – a market, a state, an institution. [...] Compared to other methodologies
based on representative agents or aggregate level analysis, e.g. computable general equilib-
rium or macroeconomic models, the main strength of [microsimulation] is indeed to simulate
how a certain policy change may differently affect heterogeneous individuals (or other entit-
ies). Furthermore, modeling at the micro level allows macro phenomena to emerge “from
the bottom up” without the aggregation bias deriving from the use of statistical average”
(Baroni and Richiardi, 2007, p. 2). Further developments of such a model led to the dynamic
microsimulation model DYNASIM (Wertheimer et al., 1986). For a comprehensive review of
microsimulation studies, see Baroni and Richiardi (2007).
Two (independently developed) contributions in which the foundations of “bottom up”
macroeconomics based on boundedly rational agents can be traced back to the microsimu-
lation approach, are those proposed by Bergmann (1974) – see also Bennett and Bergmann,
1986 –, and Eliasson (1977) – see also Eliasson, 1984). Indeed, Neugart and Richiardi (2012,
p. 3), which refer in particular to the analysis of the labor market, maintain that the roots
of agent-based models (ABMs) “must be traced back to two early studies that are generally
not even recognized as belonging to the AB tradition: Barbara Bergmann’s microsimulation
of the US economy (Bergmann, 1974) and Gunnar Eliasson’s microsimulation of the Swedish
economy (Eliasson, 1976)”.
The “transactions model” by Bergmann (1974) is a development of Orcutt’s microsimu-
lation approach, in which the behavior of individual agents is based on decision rules, rather
than consisting of transition probabilities from one state to another. As noted by Neugart and
Richiardi (2012, p. 8), “in the early 1974 version, only one bank, one financial intermediary
and six firms, ‘representative’ of six different types of industrial sectors / consumer goods
(motor vehicles, other durables, nondurables, services and construction) are simulated. In
the labor market, firms willing to hire make offers to particular workers, some of which are
accepted; some vacancies remain unfilled, with the vacancy rate affecting the wage setting
mechanism. Unfortunately, the details of the search process are described only in a tech-
nical paper that is not easily available anymore (Bergmann, 1973). Admittedly, the model
was defined by Bermann herself as a ‘work in progress’, and was completed only years later
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(Bennett and Bergmann, 1986)”.
The “micro-to-macro” model by Eliasson (1976), which we can also refer to as MOSES
(“Model of the Swedish Economy”) is a dynamic microsimulation model in which firms and
workers are the basic unit of analysis. While a concise description can be found in Eliasson
(1977), a developed version of such a model is that proposed in Eliasson (1991). MOSES is
particularly suited for analyzing industrial growth; therefore, manufacturing is the most de-
tailed sector in the model. The manufacturing sector is divided into four industries/markets
(raw materials, processing, semi-manufacturing, durable goods manufacturing), and the man-
ufacturing of consumer nondurables. In particular, the manufacturing sector is populated by
225 firms, a bank, the government, an exogenous foreign sector; then, there are an entry-
exit process and the markets replacing mechanical input-output coefficients between selling
and buying firms.1 In such an experimentally organized market environment, competition
does not lead to a “competitive equilibrium”. Indeed, the MOSES model considers Smithian
competition, involving rivalry and an entry-exit process related to innovation dynamics. Ac-
cording to Eliasson (1991), this creates a continuous state of disequilibrium, leads to economic
growth, and generates systematic divergences between ex ante plans and ex post realizations,
providing a synthesis of Schumpeterian and Wicksellian ideas in the spirit of the Stockholm
School.
The MOSES model has been used to study the characteristics of both business fluctuations
and endogenous growth.2 This model also has assumptions about money and credit. Al-
though the interest rate is set exogenously, it can depend on firms’ risk and credit rationing.
Moreover, the framework has been extended to include venture capital by capitalists of hetero-
geneous competence as a source of economic growth (Ballot et al., 2006). However, the model
does not have multiple banks; consequently, bank failures are not considered. Moreover, the
model does not consider the equity market.
During the 1990s, the MOSES model has been further extended in order to better analyze
some economic growth issues such as the effects of many types of endogenous technical pro-
gress, the process of learning by doing, the introduction of incremental and radical innovations
based on R&D and “human capital” investments, and the role of incremental and radical im-
itations. These features yield endogenous waves of innovation but also the possibility of
extended “lock-in” periods (Ballot and Taymaz, 1998). A recent extension with 16 countries
shows that the combination of endogenous competencies and spillovers can reproduce “club
convergence” and “global divergence”.
1The boundedly rational rules which guide agent behavior are based on a 5 year period of interviews with
large US firms and have been formalized in a book (Eliasson, 1976).
2Moreover, the model shows (see Eliasson, 1985, p.78-83) emergent non-trivial phenomena such as the fact
that a fast stabilization of prices is detrimental to macroeconomics stability, that structural diversity makes
the economy more stable against shocks and lowers growth losses, and that entry is a central feature in an
innovative economy.
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Finally, a central feature of the MOSES model is that major costs of macroeconomic growth
are due to agents’ mistaken plans which generate non-linear dynamics and path-dependent
trajectories. Consequently, model simulations may exhibit an unpredictable and disorderly
behavior. According to Eliasson (1991), this means that the complexity of such a model,
although less complex than reality, prevents the external observer from predicting the beha-
vior of the economic system. This also holds for policy makers which should behave quite
cautiously, so to avoid to do more harm than good through policy interventions. We will
provide a comparison between some aspects of this model and some characteristics of the one
we propose in the present paper.
Let’s now discuss some other recent contributions in the field of agent-based computational
economics, with a particular emphasis on the analysis of macroeconomic dynamics. Howitt
and Clower (2000) show that economic organization may emerge from the bottom-up through
decentralized interactions. Fagiolo et al. (2004) investigate labor market dynamics and the
evolution of aggregate output. In particular, they model a decentralized matching process to
describe the interaction between workers and firms in context characterized by endogenous
price formation and stochastic technical progress. Delli Gatti et al. (2005) show that the
interaction of financially fragile firms generates power law distributions and may lead to large
crises. Along these lines, Delli Gatti et al. (2009, 2010) analyze the role of financial factors
in a credit network economy in which even small shocks may lead to bankruptcy avalanches.
Russo et al. (2007) present an agent-based model in which bounded rational firms and
workers interact on fully decentralized markets both for final goods and labor. The model
is used to analyze the role of fiscal policy in promoting R&D investments that may increase
economic growth. This model has been further developed by Gaffeo et al. (2008) through the
introduction of a similar matching protocol for the credit market. Haber (2008) investigates
the effects of fiscal and monetary policies in a macroeconomic framework. Westerhoff (2008)
analyzes the role of regulatory policies on financial markets. Neugart (2008) evaluates the
role of labor market policies. Deissenberg et al. (2008) provide a massively parallel agent-
based model, named EURACE, which they use to simulate the European economy. Based on
the EURACE framework, Cincotti et al. (2010) investigate the interplay between monetary
aggregates and the dynamics of output and prices by considering both the credit extended
by commercial banks and the money supply created by the central bank. In particular,
they study the effects of quantitative easing as a monetary policy. Building upon Dosi et
al (2006, 2010), Dosi et al. (2012) analyze the interplay between income distribution and
economic policies. They find that more unequal economies are exposed to more severe business
cycles fluctuations, higher unemployment rates, and higher probability of crises. They also
find that fiscal policies dampen business cycles, reduce unemployment and the likelihood
of large crises, and may affect positively long-term growth. Westerhoff and Franke (2012)
analyze the effectiveness of various stabilization policies, so using the agent-based approach for
economic policy design. Hence, agents-based macroeconomic models show that an alternative
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formulation of microfoundations is possible for complex environment and this has relevant
implications for policy advice (Dawid and Neugart, 2011). Fagiolo and Roventini (2009, 2012)
review both methodological and policy-oriented papers employing agent-based simulation
techniques.
Our aim is to develop a macroeconomic framework with heterogeneous agents that in-
teract through a decentralized matching process presenting common features across markets.
The framework is basic since we propose a minimal macroeconomic model and it is flexible
because this baseline setup is thought to be enriched by adding new modules with different
agents, markets, and institutions. Indeed, in this paper we propose an agent-based macroe-
conomic model in which there are three classes of computational agents - individuals, firms,
banks - interacting in four markets - goods, labor, credit and deposit - according to a fully
decentralized matching mechanism. Moreover, we build a model in which stocks and flows are
mutually consistent. Stock-flow consistency is a very important feature (Godley and Lavoie,
2006) that economists are applying also in the field of agent-based macroeconomics as, for
instance, in Cincotti et al. (2010, 2012), Kinsella et al. (2011), Seppecher (2012).
This paper is just a first step towards a complex task that is the development of a micro-
founded general (dis)equilibrium macroeconomic model based on heterogeneous interacting
agents. Although the model is populated by many heterogeneous agents which interact in a
truly decentralized way in different markets, various features of a macroeconomic framework
have still to be introduced, for instance technological progress, human capital, the foreign
sector, etc. For these reasons, it is quite difficult to compare our result with those emerging
from other models which instead include long-run growth factors, as for instance the previously
discussed MOSES model. Moreover, our model is much more focused on the relationship
between financial factors and the real economy, considering the possibility of firm and bank
defaults. In our framework, indeed, even small shocks can lead to large fluctuations due to
financial contagion. Thus we focus on some characteristics such as the dynamics of financial
variables – firms’ leverage, banks’ exposure – and their interplay with the business cycle.
Indeed, many papers recently try to understand the leverage process both for firms and
banks: Adrian and Shin (2008, 2009, 2010), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), Flannery
(1994), Fostel and Geanakoplos (2008), Greenlaw, Hatzius, Kashyap and Shin (2008), He,
Khang and Krishnamurthy (2010), Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011).3 Geanakoplos (2010) finds
that leverage is pro-cyclical, while Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2011), as well as Adrian and Shin
3Although the word “exposure” is usually used in a credit risk context (for instance the exposure at default
– EAD – in Basel II agreement), here it exactly refers to the ratio between corporate credit and equity, which
is different to the asset/equity ratio, given that in the balance sheet there are also assets which are supposed
to be risk free: government bonds and, in the case of mismatches, residual cash. In addition, according to
the Basel II framework, all our corporate credits have EAD equal to 1 (especially under the “foundation
approach”) then the overall bank EAD is just the sum of the extended corporate loans. For these reasons, we
think that the word “exposure” is more appropriate compared to other words (such as “leverage”, that could
be a better choice for the asset/equity ratio).
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(2008, 2009), find that the leverage pattern for non-financial firms is acyclical (instead this is
pro-cyclical for investment banks and large commercial banks).
The leverage level is a component of a more general discussion on firm and bank capital
structure, such as in Booth et al. (2001), Diamond and Rajan (2000), Gropp and Heider
(2010), Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008), Rajan and Zingales (1995). In the economic
literature there are many theories on capital structure but almost all previous papers in the
agent-based macroeconomic approach assumed a “pecking order” theory (Donaldson, 1961;
Myers and Majluf, 1984), based on information asymmetry, according to which investments
are financed first with internally generated funds, then with debt if internal funds are not
enough, and equity is used as a last resort. A different perspective on the firms’ financial
structure was proposed by the “trade-off” theory, firstly observed in a paper concerning asset
substitution (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), and in a work on underinvestment (Myers, 1977).
This theory is based on the trade-off between the costs and benefits of debt and implies that
firms select a target debt-equity ratio. The empirical literature found at first contrasting evid-
ence to support these theories. Then, a refined version of the trade-off theory was proposed:
the “dynamic trade-off theory” (Flannery and Rangan, 2006). In this theory firms actively
pursue target debt ratios even though market frictions temper the speed of adjustment. In
other words, firms have long-run leverage targets, but they do not immediately reach them,
instead they adjust to them during some periods. Dynamic trade-off seems to be able to
overcome some puzzles related to the other theories, explaining the stylized facts emerging
from the empirical analysis and numerous papers conclude that it dominates alternative hy-
potheses: Hovakimian, Opler, and Titman (2001), Mehotra, Mikkelsen, and Partch (2003),
Frank and Goyal (2008), Flannery and Rangan (2006). Moreover, Graham and Harvey (2001)
conduct a survey where they evidence that 81% of firms affirm to consider a target debt ratio
or range when making their debt decisions.
Then, one of the major innovations we introduce compared to the agent-based macroeconomic
framework delineated in the literature is that firms’ financial structure is derived from the
Dynamic Trade-Off theory. According to this theory, we assume that firms have a “target
leverage”, that is a desired ratio between debt and net worth, and they try to reach it by
following an adaptive rule governing credit demand. This capital structure is already invest-
igated in the agent-based model proposed by Riccetti et al. (2013) that builds upon the
previous work by Delli Gatti et al. (2010), which is based on a firms’ capital structure given
by the Pecking Order theory. The Dynamic Trade-Off theory has a relevant role in influencing
the leverage cycle, with important consequences on macroeconomic dynamics.4
4First of all, our choice of introducing the Dynamic Trade-Off theory in the model is due to empirical
reasons, as motivated by the literature on the topic cited above. Moreover, in Delli Gatti et al. (2010)
the Pecking Order theory is associated to a different production function and a peculiar sectorial structure
of the economy. Besides, that paper is an extension of a previous one (Delli Gatti et al., 2005) which was
already based on the Pecking Order theory: Delli Gatti et al. (2010) proposed a way to study the diffusion of
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Another important point in the model is the presence of an acyclical sector, here represented
by the government that hires public workers so providing a fraction of the aggregate demand.
In this way the government partially stabilizes the economy by reducing output volatility.
Nevertheless, our model also demonstrates that large and extended crises with large unem-
ployment and a lacking aggregate demand may endogenously emerge. This also means that
the model can exhibit unpredictable behaviors and path-dependent trajectories which depend
on historical accidents. As in the case of the MOSES model (Eliasson, 1991), the modeler as
well as the external observer (and also policy makers) cannot predict the realization of a large
crisis, due to the complexity of individual and collective behaviors. However, one can detect
a tendency of the economic system towards the crisis, as we will see when we discuss model
simulations.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we explain the basic aspects of the modeling
framework such as the sequence of events and the matching mechanism. Section 3 presents
the working of the four markets which compose our economy. The evolution of agents’ wealth
is described in Section 4, while the behavior of policy makers is discussed in Section 5. Model
dynamics are studied in Section 6 in which we report the simulation results. Moreover, in
Section 7 we develop some Monte Carlo experiments in order to: (i) investigate the relationship
between financial factors and the real economy, (ii) analyze the peculiar aspects of extended
crises. In Section 8 we analyze the role of the government as an employer of public workers: in
particular, we study the influence of the public sector’s size (and then the interplay between
the private economy and the public sector) on macroeconomic dynamics. Section 9 concludes.
2 Model setup
The macroeconomy is populated by individuals (i = 1, 2, ..., H), firms (f = 1, 2, ..., F ), banks
(b = 1, 2, ..., B), a central bank, and the government, which interact over a time span t =
1, 2, ..., T in the following four markets:
• Credit market: firms and banks.
• Labor market: firms and individuals.
• Goods market: individuals and firms.
• Deposit market: banks and individuals.
bankruptcy in such a framework through adding an upstream sector to Delli Gatti et al. (2005). In presence
of a downstream sector characterized by a firm’s financial structure based on the Pecking Order theory,
the introduction of an upstream sector (without such a financial structure) allowed the model to exhibit
bankruptcy avalanches. Instead, in our case we do not need such an assumption, given that the financial
structure of firms based on the Dynamic Trade-Off theory allows us to analyze firm and bank defaults in a
more natural way.
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Agents are boundedly rational and follow (relatively) simple rules of behaviour in an
incomplete and asymmetric information context: individuals try to buy consumption goods
from the cheapest supplier, they also try to work in the firm offering the highest wage; firms
try to accumulate profits by selling their products to individuals (they set the price according
to their individual excess demand) and hiring cheapest workers; workers update the asked
wage according to their occupational status (upward if employed, downward if unemployed);
individuals’ saving goes into bank deposits; given the Basel-like regulatory constraints, banks
extend credit to finance firms’ production; firms choose the banks offering lowest interest
rates, while individuals deposit money in the banks offering the highest interest rates. The
government hires public workers, taxes private agents and issues public debt. Finally, the
central bank provides money to banks and the government given their requirements.
In the following subsections we firstly describe the sequence of events occurring in each
period. Subsequently, we explain the working of the matching mechanism which characterizes
the interaction structure of all markets.
2.1 Sequence of events
The sequence of events occurring in each period runs as follows:
1. At first firms ask for credit to banks given the demand deriving from their net worth
and leverage target. In each period, the leverage level changes according to expected
profits and inventories.
2. Banks set their credit supply depending on their net worth, deposits and the quantity of
money provided by the central bank. Moreover, they must comply with some regulatory
constraints.
3. Banks and firms interact in the credit market. At the end of the matching process,
some banks may lend all the available credit supply while others may remain with some
residual money; similarly, some firms may obtain the required credit while other may
remain credit constrained.
4. The government hires public workers. Moreover, it collects taxes (coming from previous
period private incomes and wealth) and, given the wage expenditure for public workers,
calculates its deficit (surplus), and updates the overall debt.
5. Banks buy government securities to employ excess liquidity. The central bank purchases
the remaining securities.
6. Firms hire workers in the labor market. The labor demand depends on available funds,
that is net worth and bank credit. After the labor matching some firms satisfy their
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labor demand, while others remain with residual cash; at the same time, some people
may remain unemployed. Employed people pay income taxes to the government.
7. Firms produce consumption goods on the basis of hired workers. They put in the goods
market their current period production and previous period inventories.
8. Individuals decide their desired consumption on the basis of their wages and wealth (net
of taxes).
9. Individuals and firms interact in the goods market. As a result, some individuals satisfy
their desired consumption, while others may remain with residual cash; on the other
hand, some firms sell all the produced output, while others may accumulate inventories.
10. Individuals determine their savings to be deposited in banks.
11. Firms calculate profits and survival firms repay their debt to banks, pay taxes, and
distribute dividends to individuals.
12. Banks calculate profits. Individuals lose (part of) deposited money in case of bank
defaults. Survival banks pay taxes and distribute dividends to individuals.
13. Agents update their wealth, on which they pay capital levy.
14. Central bank decides the amount of money to be lent to banks in the following period
according to credit demand/supply unbalance.
15. New entrants replace bankrupted agents (firms or banks with negative net worth) ac-
cording to a one-to-one replacement. New agents enter the system with initial conditions
we will define below. Moreover, the money needed to finance entrants is subtracted from
individuals’ wealth. In the case private wealth is not enough, then government inter-
venes. Therefore, the model is stock flow consistent given that we do not create new
financial resources when new entrants substitute defaulted agents.
2.2 The matching mechanism
In each of the four markets composing our macroeconomy the following matching protocol
is at work. In general, two classes of agents interact, that is the demand and the supply
sides. One side observes a list of potential counterparts and chooses the most suitable partner
according to some market-specific criteria.
At the beginning, a random list of agents in the demand side – firms in the credit market,
firms in the labor market, individuals in the goods market, and banks in the deposit market –
is set. Then, the first agent in the list observes a random subset of potential partners, whose
size depends on a parameter 0 < χ ≤ 1 (which proxies the degree of imperfect information),
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and chooses the cheapest one. For example, in the labor market, the first firm on the list, say
the firm f1 observes the asked wage of a subsample of workers and chooses the agent asking
for the lowest one, say the worker i1.
After that, the second agent on the list performs the same activity on a new random subset of
the updated potential partner list. In the case of the labor market, the new list of potential
workers to be hired no longer contains the worker i1. The process iterates till the end of
the demand side list (in our example, all the firms enter the matching process and have the
possibility to employ one worker).
Then, a new random list of agents in the demand side is set and the whole matching mechanism
goes on until either one side of the market (demand or supply) is empty or no further matchings
are feasible because the highest bid (for example, the money till available to the richest firm)
is lower than the lowest ask (for example, the lowest wage asked by till unemployed workers).
Given this matching protocol governing agents’ interaction, now we describe the details
of agents’ behavior in the four markets.
3 Markets
3.1 Credit market
Firms and banks interact in this market: firms want to finance production and banks may
provide credit to this end. Firm’s f credit demand at time t depends on its net worth Aft
and the leverage target lft. Hence, required credit is:
Bdft = Aft · lft (1)
The leverage target is set according to the following rule:
lft =
8
>
>
>
<
>
>
>
:
lft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) > ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1, if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) = ift−1 and yˆft−1 < ψ · yft−1
lft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if pift−1/(Aft−1 +Bft−1) < ift−1 or yˆft−1 ≥ ψ · yft−1
(2)
where α > 0 is a parameter representing the maximum percentage change of the relevant
variable (in this case the target leverage), U(0, 1) is a random number picked from a uniform
distribution in the interval (0,1), pift−1 is the gross profit (realized in the previous period),
Bft−1 is the previous period effective debt, ift−1 is the nominal interest rate paid on previ-
ous debts,5 yˆft−1 represents inventories (that is, unsold goods), 0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1 is a parameter
representing a threshold for inventories based on previous period production yft−1.
5It is a mean interest rate calculated as the weighted average of interests paid to the lending banks.
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On the other side, bank b offers a total amount of money Bdbt depending on net worth Abt,
deposits Dbt, central bank credit mbt, and some legal constraints (proxied by the parameters
γ1 > 0 and 0 ≤ γ2 ≤ 1 that represents respectively the maximum admissible leverage and
maximum percentage of capital to be invested in lending activities):
Bdbt = min(kˆbt, k¯bt) (3)
where kˆ = γ1·Abt, k¯ = γ2·Abt+Dbt−1+mbt. Moreover, in order to reduce risk concentration,
banks lend to a single firm up to a maximum fraction β of the total amount of the credit
Bdbt. This behavioural parameter can be also interpreted as a regulatory constraint to avoid
excessive concentration.
The interest rate charged by the bank b on the firm f at time t is given by:
ibft = i
CB
t + iˆbt + i¯ft (4)
where iCBt is the nominal interest rate set by the central bank at time t, iˆbt is a bank-
specific component, and i¯ft = ρ
lft/100 is a firm-specific component, that is a risk premium
on firm target leverage.
The bank-specific component evolves as follows:
iˆbt =
8
<
:
iˆbt · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 > 0
iˆbt · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bˆbt−1 = 0
(5)
where Bˆbt−1 is the amount of money that the bank did not manage to lend to firms in the
previous period.
Given this setting on credit supply and demand, firms and banks interact according to the
matching mechanism. As a consequence, each firm ends up with a credit Bft ≤ B
d
ft and each
bank lends to firms an amount Bbt ≤ B
d
bt. The difference between desired and effective credit
is equal to Bdft−Bft = Bˆft and B
d
bt−Bbt = Bˆbt, for firms and banks respectively. Moreover, we
hypothesize that banks ask for an investment in government securities equal to Γdbt = k¯bt−Bbt.
6
If the sum of desired government bonds exceeds the amount of outstanding public debt then
the effective investment Γbt is rescaled according to a factor Γ
d
bt/
P
Γdbt. Instead, if public debt
exceeds the banks’ desired amount, then the central bank buys the difference.
6We consider government bonds as risk free assets. Banks that do not manage to lend all the disposable
money, decide to invest in government bonds to obtain a small but positive risk free return able to cover the
return paid on deposits. In the case k¯ is smaller than kˆ the bank has not enough money to lend, and then it
cannot reach the maximum admissible leverage on risky assets. On the contrary, when kˆ is smaller than k¯ the
bank has an excess of money with respect to the amount that it can invest in risky assets. As a consequence,
the bank buy government securities obtaining the remuneration given by the risk free rate.
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3.2 Labor market
In each period, workers post a wage wit which is updated according to the following rule:
wit =
8
<
:
wit−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if i employed at time t− 1
wit−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if i unemployed at time t− 1
(6)
However, the required wage has a minimum related to the price of a single good net of
income tax.
The government hires a randomly selected fraction g of individuals. The remaining part
is available for working in the firms. Firm’s f labor demand depends on the total capital
available: Aft + Bft. Hence, given this amount, a firm hires a worker. Then, the firm hires
another worker, if the residual money is enough and so on. Given this setting on labor supply
and demand, firms and individuals interact according to the matching mechanism. As a
consequence, each firm ends up with a number of workers nft and residual cash (insufficient
to hire an additional worker). Obviously, a fraction of individuals may remain unemployed.
For the sake of simplicity, the wage of unemployed people is set equal to zero.
3.3 Goods market
In this market individuals represent the demand side, while firms are the supply side. Indi-
viduals set the desired consumption as follows:
cdit = c1 · wit + c2 ·Ait (7)
where 0 < c1 ≤ 1 is the propensity to consume current income, 0 ≤ c2 ≤ 1 is the propensity
to consume the wealth Ait. If the amount c
d
it is smaller than the average price of one good
p¯ then cdit = min(p¯ , wit + Ait). By summing up the consumption of individuals we obtain
the aggregate demand. It is worth noticing that current income derives from both a cyclical
private industrial sector and an acyclical public service sector.
Firm f produces an amount of goods given by:
yft = φ · nft (8)
where φ ≥ 1 is a productivity parameter.
The firm tries to sell this produced amount plus the inventories yˆft−1. The selling price
evolves according to this rule:
pft =
8
<
:
pft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 = 0 and yft−1 > 0
pft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft−1 > 0 or yft−1 = 0
(9)
However, the minimum price is set such that it is at least equal to the average cost of
production.
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Given this setting on goods supply and demand, individuals and firms interact according
to the matching mechanism. As a consequence, each individual ends up with a residual cash,
that is not enough to buy an additional good and that she will try to deposit in a bank. On
the other hand, firms sell an amount 0 ≤ y¯ft ≤ yft and they may remain with unsold goods
(that is, the inventories yˆft = yft − y¯ft that the firm will try to sell in the next period).
3.4 Deposit market
In the deposit market, banks represent the demand side (because they require capital to
extend credit) and individuals are on the supply side. Banks offer an interest rate on deposits
according to their funds requirement:
iDbt =
8
<
:
iDbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt > 0
min{iDbt−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , iCBt}, if k¯bt −Bbt − Γbt = 0
(10)
where Γbt is the amount of public debt bought by bank b at time t. Hence, the previous
equation states that if a bank exhausts the credit supply by lending to private firms or
government then it decides to increase the interest rate paid on deposits, so to attract new
depositors, and vice versa. However, the interest rate on deposits can increase till a maximum
given by the policy rate iCBt which is both the rate at which banks could refinance from the
central bank and the rate paid by the government on public bonds.
individuals set the minimum interest rate they want to obtain on bank deposits as follows:
iDit =
8
<
:
iDit−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 = 0
iDit−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Dit−1 > 0
(11)
where Dit−1 is the individual i’s deposit in the previous period. This means that an
individual that found a bank paying an interest rate higher or equal to the desired one decides
to ask for a higher remuneration. In the opposite case, she did not find a bank satisfying her
requirements, thus she kept her money in cash and now she asks for a lower rate. We assume
that an individual deposits all the available money in a single bank that offers an adequate
interest rate. In the opposite case, she does not accept to deposit her cash for an interest rate
below the desired one.
4 Wealth evolution
4.1 Firms
According to the outcomes of the credit, labor and goods markets, the firm f ’s profit is equal
to:
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pift = pft · y¯ft −Wft − Ift (12)
where Wft is the firm f ’s wage bill, that is the sum of wages paid to employed workers,
and Ift is the sum of interests paid on bank loans.
Firms pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits are subtracted in the
computation of the taxes that should be paid on the next positive profits. We indicate net
profits with p¯ift.
Finally, firms pay a percentage δft as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤ δft ≤
1 evolves according to the following rule:
δft =
8
<
:
δft−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft = 0 and yft > 0
δft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if yˆft > 0 or yft = 0
(13)
Therefore, if the firm sold all its output in the previous period, then it decides to retain a
larger fraction of profits to enlarge the production. Instead, if the firm faced an excess supply
and then it has inventories to sell, it decides to distribute more profits as dividends, given
that it does not need to produce more and more. We indicate the profit net of taxes and
dividends as pˆift. Obviously, in case of negative profits pˆift = pift.
Thus, the firm f ’s net worth evolves as follows:
Aft = (1− τ
′) · [Aft−1 + pˆift] (14)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Aft ≤ 0 then the firm goes bankrupt and a new entrant takes its place. The initial net
worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods price, while the target leverage
is one. Moreover, the initial price is equal to the mean price of survival firms. Banks linked
to defaulted firms lose a fraction of their loans (the loss given default rate is calculated as
(Aft +Bft)/Bft).
4.2 Banks
As a consequence of operations in the credit and the deposit markets, the bank b’s profit is
equal to:
pibt = intbt + i
Γ
t · Γbt − i
D
bt−1 ·Dbt−1 − i
CB
t ·mbt − badbt (15)
where intbt represents the interests gained on lending to non-defaulted firms, i
Γ
t is the
interest rate on government securities (Γbt), and badbt is the amount of “bad debt” due to
bankrupted firms, that is non performing loans. Bad debt is the loss given default of the total
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loan, that is a fraction 1 − (Aft + Bft)/Bft of the loan to defaulted firm f connected with
bank b.
Banks pay a proportional tax τ on positive profits; negative profits will be used to reduce
taxes paid on the next positive profits. We indicate net profits with p¯ibt.
Finally, banks pay a percentage δbt as dividends on positive net profits. The fraction 0 ≤
δbt ≤ 1 evolves according to the following rule:
δbt =
8
<
:
δbt−1 · (1− α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt > 0 and Bˆbt = 0
δft−1 · (1 + α · U(0, 1)) , if Bbt = 0 or Bˆbt > 0
(16)
Indeed, if the bank does not manage to lend the desired supply of credit then it decides to
distribute more dividends (because it does not need high reinvested profits), and vice versa.
We indicate the profit net of taxes and dividends as pˆibt. Obviously, in case of negative
profits pˆibt = pibt.
Thus, the bank b’s net worth evolves as follows:
Abt = (1− τ
′) · [Abt−1 + pˆibt] (17)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price).
If Abt ≤ 0 then the bank is in default and a new entrant takes its place. Individuals linked
to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits (the loss given default rate is calculated as
(Abt +Dbt)/Dbt). The initial net worth of the new entrant is a multiple of the average goods
price. Moreover, the initial bank-specific component of the interest rate (ˆibt) is equal to the
mean value across banks.
4.3 Individuals
According to the outcomes of the labor, goods, and deposit markets, the individual i’s wealth
evolves as follows:
Ait = (1− τ
′) · [(Ait−1 + (1− τ) · wit + divit + int
D
it − cit] (18)
where τ ′ is the tax rate on wealth (applied only on wealth exceeding a threshold τ¯ ′ · p¯,
that is a multiple of the average goods price), τ is the tax rate on income, wit is the wage
gained by employed workers, divit is the fraction (proportional to the individual i’s wealth
compared to overall individuals’ wealth) of dividends distributed by firms and banks net of
the amount of resources needed to finance new entrants (hence, this value may be negative),
intDit represents interests on deposits, and cit ≤ c
d
it is the effective consumption. Individuals
linked to defaulted banks lose a fraction of their deposits as already explained above.
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5 Government and central bank
On the one hand, the government’s current expenditure is given by the sum of wages paid to
public workers (Gt), the interests paid on public debt to banks, and an amount Ωt which is
normally zero but for extreme cases in which the government has to intervene to finance new
entrants when private wealth is not enough. On the other hand, government collects taxes
on incomes and wealth, and receives interests gained by the central bank. The difference
between expenditures and revenues is the public deficit Ψt. Consequently, public debt is
Γt = Γt−1 +Ψt.
Central bank decides the policy rate iCBt and put a quantity of money into the system in
accordance with it. In order to do that, the central bank observes the aggregate excess supply
or demand in the credit market and sets an amount of money Mt to reduce the gap in the
following period.
6 Simulations
We run a baseline simulation for a time span of T =150 periods and analyze the results for the
last 50 (so the first 100 are used to initialize the model). Table 1 shows the parameter setting of
the baseline simulation. The initial agents’ wealth is set as follows: Af1 = max{0.1, N(3, 1)},
Ab1 = max{0.2, N(5, 1)}, Ah1 = max{0.01, N(0.5, 0.01)}. The policy rate i
CB
t is constant at
1%.
Simulation results are displayed in Figure 1 and show that endogenous business cycles
emerge as a consequence of the interaction between real and financial factors. When firms’
profits are improving, they try to expand the production and, if banks extend the required
credit, this results in more employment; the decrease of the unemployment rate leads to the
rise of wages that, on the one hand, increases the aggregate demand, while on the other hand
reduces firms’ profits, and this may cause the inversion of the business cycle. This feature of
the business cycle is described in Figure 2 where we show the cross-correlation between the
unemployment rate and the firms’ profit rate.7 First of all, there is a high positive correlation
at lag 0: the profit rate is high when unemployment is high given that firms save on produc-
tion costs (e.g., wage bill) but, at the same time, the aggregate demand does not decrease
proportionally, because of public workers’ expenditure and consumption due to wealth, thus
firms can sell their commodities (including inventories) in the goods market. However, the
presence of unemployed people, the tendency of wages to decrease due to the high unemploy-
ment rate, and the reduction of individuals’ wealth, cause the fall of next period aggregate
demand that, in turn, reduces firms’ profits. Indeed, Figure 2 displays a negative correlation
at lag +1. Instead, the negative correlation at lag -1 means that increasing profits boost the
7In order to obtain a more statistical significant result we extended the simulation period to T=500.
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Table 1: Parameter setting
H number of individuals 500
F number of firms 80
B number of banks 10
α adjustment parameter 0.05
χ matching imperfect information 0.2
ψ inventory threshold 0.1
γ1 max bank’s leverage 10
γ2 max % of bank’s invested capital in lending 0.5
β max bank’s lending to single firm 0.5
ρ risk premium on firm’s loan 2
c1 propensity to consume current income 0.8
c2 propensity to consume wealth 0.3
φ firm’s productivity 3
τ tax rate on income 0.3
τ ′ tax rate on wealth 0.05
τ¯ ′ threshold for tax on wealth 3
g % of public workers on population 0.33
expansion of the economy and then a fall of the unemployment rate follows.8
The two major innovations we introduce in this agent-based framework, that is (i) the Dy-
namic Trade-Off theory for firms’ capital structure and its interplay with banks’ credit supply,
(ii) the role of an acyclical sector, have opposite effects on business fluctuations. On one hand,
firms’ leverage and, in particular, banks’ exposure enlarge business fluctuations: a growing
firm requires more credit and, if banks extended new loans, then they are able to expand the
production through the employment of more workers; after a while, the rise of employment
fosters wages that, together with the rise of interest payments on an increasing debt, reduces
firms’ profitability. Thus the business cycle reverses and financial factors amplify the fall
of production (the relatively low level of profits with respect to interest payments induces a
8This short business cycle of around three periods could be enlarged by changing the parameter setting.
For instance, assuming a different adjustment parameter of prices and wages can impact the macroeconomic
system. We tried a simulation with parameter α used in equation 9 equal to 0.10, that is, prices move more
rapidly than wages, in a more realistic setting. The macroeconomic system acts similarly to the baseline
setting, but the business cycle is longer and more volatile, and the mean unemployment rate is higher, with
a higher probability of large crises. More in general, the mismatch between the two mechanism enlarges
the unemployment (and then the output) volatility. However, the analysis of different adjustment speeds
deserves a deeper study, and it should be very important to simulate asymmetric behaviours (for instance
wages and prices could be represented with a stronger rigidity in reductions than in rises). Moreover, an
accurate parameter calibration is needed, but should be founded on a more complete model, that we aim to
develop starting from this framework.
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Figure 2: Unemployment rate and firms’ profit rate.
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deleveraging process). In other words, credit is pro-cyclical. In particular, there is a negative
but modest correlation between firms’ leverage and the unemployment rate (-0.1539), while
there is a more significant negative correlation between banks’ exposure and unemployment
(-0.3670). This simulation result is consistent with the empirical evidence on the topic (see,
for instance, Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2011). Accordingly, banks’ capitalization plays a relev-
ant role in determining credit conditions, so influencing firms’ leverage and, in general, the
macroeconomic evolution. On the other hand, the presence of an acyclical sector, here rep-
resented by the government, has a fundamental role in sustaining the aggregate demand and
in mitigating output volatility.
The nominal GDP grows along time as a consequence of price inflation (given that there
is no productivity growth in the baseline model). The average inflation rate is 2.07% with
a minimum of 1.12% and a maximum of 2.87%. The unemployment rate oscillates around
8.42% with a minimum of 4% and a maximum of 12.8%. Model simulation reproduces a
Phillips curve, which is a negative relationship between wage inflation and unemployment
rate (the correlation coefficient is -0.76). The average fraction of firms going bankrupt is
6.3%, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 25%. The average fraction of bank defaults
is 1.2%, with a minimum of zero and a maximum of 10%. Bank’s leverage is inversely related
to bank’s net worth. The per-capita average banks’ net worth (in real terms) is 8.91 (min
7.30, max 11.23). Moreover, credit mismatch (that is the difference between banks’ credit
supply and firms’ credit demand) tends to follow the cycle of banks’ net worth: when banks
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are poorly capitalized this results in credit rationing for firms; in this case, the central bank
intervenes providing credit to banks; on the contrary, when banks are well capitalized they
are able to fulfill all credit demand. Accordingly, firms’ mean leverage is influenced by credit
availability. The mean interest rate charged by banks on firm loans is 8.11%. Per-capita
individuals wealth (in real terms) is stable around 2.06 (min 2.01, max 2.10), while the same
value for firms is equal to 3.91 (min 3.54, max 4.31). Finally, the average ratio between public
deficit and GDP is equal to 3.09% (min 2.16%, max 4.22%). It is worth to note that the
presence of the government, nevertheless the relatively low level of public deficit, allows for
the nominal growth in the model. This outcome also depends on the working of the central
bank that finances the government buying public securities charging a low interest rate.
7 Monte Carlo analysis
In order to check the robustness of our findings, we performed 1000 Monte Carlo simulations
of the baseline model. The first result of this computational experiment is that in some
replications the economy completely crashes and the unemployment rate reaches very large
values. To identify the worst case scenarios we set a threshold for the average unemployment
rate equal to 20%. Then, we discard the five simulations with an average unemployment rate
(computed over the time span 101-150) above the threshold. The statistics of the Monte Carlo
experiment on the remaining 995 simulations are reported in Table 2. The results describe
the average macroeconomic behaviour of the system, showing that mean variables values are
quite stable across repeated simulations. The only two variables which are more unstable
across simulations are: the credit constraint (that is, the fraction of firms’ required credit not
fulfilled by banks), and the bank exposure (calculated as the amount of credit lent to firms
divided by net worth). The latter variable has a relevant procyclical impact on the economy,
that is there is a significant negative correlation between bank exposure and unemployment.
In particular, the mean value across simulations is equal to -50.09% (with a standard deviation
of 16.03%).
7.1 Financial factors and the real economy
Now we analyze in more detail the relationship between financial variables, like firm lever-
age and bank exposure, and the unemployment rate (which represents the main real variable
in our macroeconomic framework). First of all, the correlation between firm leverage and
the unemployment rate is around -0.2, while the correlation between bank exposure and the
unemployment rate is around -0.3. Then, the expansionary phase of the business cycle is
boosted by financial factors through a leveraging process, while the recession is amplified by
the deleveraging.
Figure 3 shows that there is a negative non-linear relation between firm leverage and unem-
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Figure 3: Firm leverage and unemployment rate.
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Figure 4: Bank exposure and unemployment rate.
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Table 2: Monte Carlo replications: mean values and corresponding standard deviation (calcu-
lated over the time span 101-150) of 995 simulations with average unemployment rate below
20%.
Variable Mean St. Dev.
Unemployment rate 9.92% 1.63%
Unemployment volatility 2.05% 0.48%
Firm default rate 6.45% 2.10%
Bank default rate 0.57% 0.57%
Wage share 63.4% 0.53%
Public deficit 3.26% 0.19%
Interest rate 9.11% 1.93%
Inflation rate 1.99% 0.07%
Credit constraint 14.83% 8.23%
Firm mean leverage 1.65 0.24
Bank mean exposure 3.27 1.30
Firm leverage volatility 0.12 0.04
Bank exposure volatility 0.51 0.33
ployment. It is worth to note that for relatively high levels of firm leverage the unemployment
rate tends to be smaller and less volatile. However, for largest values of the firm leverage
(above 2) the negative relation with the unemployment rate tends to disappear or rather it
reverses (as shown by the cubic fit in the Figure).9
Figure 4 shows that a non-linear relation between bank exposure and unemployment emerges.
In particular, for low levels, an increase of bank exposure reduces the rate of unemployment.
Instead, for high levels of bank exposure (that is, above 5) a further increase makes the un-
employment higher. In other words, if banks increase their exposure enlarging credit to firms,
the latter hire more workers and the unemployment rate decreases. But, when the exposure
of banks becomes “excessive” this leads to instability (more failures) and an increase of the
9We test if the quadratic and cubic coefficients fit the data with a t-test on the two coefficients and a F-test
on both coefficients jointly: all the tests strongly reject (at 99% confidence level) the null hypothesis that the
coefficients are equal to zero. Moreover, all the information criteria (Akaike, Schwartz and Hannan-Quinn)
select the cubic fit as the best. The information criteria also signal that the cubic fit overperforms the fourth
degree polynomial fit and the coefficient of the fourth degree component is not statistically significant. The
equation of the cubic fit, where U is the unemployment rate and Lf is the aggregate firm leverage level, is the
following:
U = −0.08 + 0.52 ∗ Lf − 0.39 ∗ L
2
f + 0.08 ∗ L
3
f
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unemployment rate follows10.
7.2 Large crises
In the previous Monte Carlo experiment we observe 5 out of 1000 cases characterized by a
large mean unemployment rate (during the period from t = 101 to t = 150). This means that
large crises can appear in the macroeconomic system. Moreover, in some simulations we note
that the time series of the main macroeconomic variables are non-stationary. In order to check
the presence of endogenous regime switches, e.g. from a “normal” period (with average values
of variables close to those in Table 2) to a large and extended crisis, we perform an additional
Monte Carlo experiment with 100 simulations over a time span of 500 periods (for the same
reasons explained above, we discard the first 100 periods of each simulation). However, this
is not a long run growth analysis given that some relevant elements for such an analysis,
like physical capital, are missing from the current version of the model. Moreover, these
elements could also influence the likelihood of large crisis. For instance, the MOSES model
proposed by Eliasson (1991) incorporates many characteristics related to long-run growth
factors such as innovation dynamics (which in turn influence the important process of entry
and exit). In such a complex economic system, unpredictable behaviors and path-dependent
trajectories can emerge and the external observer as well as the policy maker cannot predict
the realization of crisis episodes. Given that unpredictable large crises can also emerge in our
simplified framework (that is, even if long-run growth factors are absent from the model), we
think that an extended version of our modeling framework in which innovation dynamics are
considered and the entry-exit process is endogenously determined (on the basis of expected
profitability) can give rise to even more interesting results regarding the interplay between
business fluctuations and endogenous growth.
As for simulation results, in 2 out of 100 simulations the macroeconomic system evolves
towards an “extended crisis” scenario, where the private sector tends to disappear, with an
unemployment rate above 60%, thus almost only public workers remain employed. In this
case, as shown in Figure 5, differently from the usual business cycle mechanism, the decrease
of wages due to growing unemployment does not reverse the cycle, but rather amplifies the
recession due to the lack of aggregate demand. In other words, the self-adjustment mechanism
which spontaneously reverses the business cycle (e.g., the rise of the unemployment rate
reduces the real wage and then the resulting increase of profits makes room for an expansionary
production phase) does not work. Indeed, real wage lowers excessively boosting a vicious circle
for which the fall of purchasing power prevents firms to sell commodities, then firms reduce
10The equation of the quadratic fit, where U is the unemployment rate and Lb is the aggregate bank
exposure level, is the following:
U = 0.168− 0.033 ∗ Lb + 0.003 ∗ L
2
b
Both coefficients are statistically significant at 99% level.
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Figure 5: The extended crisis case: unemployment rate and real wage.
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production, unemployment continues to rise, and the system moves towards a devastating
crisis.
In particular, in one of the two extended crises detected in the Monte Carlo experiment,
the production system completely crashes and cannot escape this trap without an exogenous
intervention. Instead, in the case explained above, the production system does not completely
disrupt, then we cannot exclude a recovery in the very long run. But, accordingly to Keynes,
“in the long run we are all dead”.
8 A sensitivity analysis wrt. parameter g
Government needs workers to manage the public balance sheet, for instance collecting income
and wealth taxes on individuals, firms and banks, issuing government bonds, paying interest
on debt, managing the relation with the central bank. Providing services to the economy,
the public sector represents the “third sector”, that is an important part of the aggregate
demand, which is less unstable compared to the “industrial sector”. We show the importance
of the acyclical sector with two sensitivity analyses on the parameter g (the percentage of
public workers on total population).
In the first analysis, we run 20 simulations (time span T=150) for each of the 21 values of
the parameter g ranging from 20% to 40%, with step 1%, for a total of 420 simulations. The
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Figure 6: Average unemployment rate and average public deficit on GDP: sensitivity analysis
wrt. the parameter g ranging from g = 20% to g = 40% with step 1% (20 simulations for
each step).
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mean unemployment rate and the mean public deficit on GDP in the last 50 periods of the
simulation (101 ≤ t ≤ 150) are reported in Figure 6. It clearly emerges that a larger acyclical
sector implies a lower average unemployment rate: when g = 20% the mean unemployment
rate is at 46.8%, while the system reaches full employment when g = 39%. Also the standard
deviation of the unemployment rate largely changes among simulations, ranging from 8.3%
when g = 20% to 0 if g = 39% − 40%. Thus, we can observe that an increase of 1% in
public employment, corresponds to about a 2.5% overall employment growth, that is if the
government hires two additional workers, this also supplies money to the economy such that
the private sector is able to hire three additional workers, with a multiplicative effect via the
aggregate demand growth.
However, in this analysis we face a large increase of the public deficit from the case of g = 20%
to the case of g = 39% (the case of g = 40% is useless, given that there is no reason for the
government to hire a fraction of individuals above 39%, because the system is already in a
full employment situation): it passes from below 2% to over 4.5% yearly. Thus, the economic
growth could be due to the increasing public deficit (with an inflationary consequence: the
inflation ranges from −0.2% when g = 20% to about 2.5% when g = 40%).11
In order to stabilize the public deficit at a common level among the simulations (about 3%),
11The public deficit decrease from g = 20% to g = 23%, given that the public expenditure is more than
compensated by the economic growth and the related tax revenues.
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Figure 7: Average unemployment rate and average public deficit on GDP: sensitivity analysis
on parameters g and τ ranging from g = 20% to g = 40% and from τ = 17% to τ = 37%,
both with step 1% (20 simulations for each step).
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we repeat the sensitivity analysis changing at the same time both the value of g ranging from
20% to 40%, and the tax rate on income τ , starting from τ = 17% to τ = 37%, with step
1% (in this way a value of g = 33% corresponds to a τ = 30%, as in the baseline setting).
Also in this case we run 20 simulations for each step, for a total of 420 simulations. The
mean unemployment rate and the mean public deficit on GDP in the last 50 periods of the
simulation are reported in Figure 7. We can confirm the previous findings also in this case,
that is a larger acyclical sector implies a lower average unemployment rate: when g = 20%
(and τ = 17%) the mean unemployment rate is above 20% (20.14%), while when g = 40%
(and τ = 37%) it is below 8% (7.71%). The deficit on GDP is quite stable (3.29% when
g = 20% and 3.51% when g = 40%). However, in this case, the difference between the
two extreme cases is much smaller (46.8% − 0% in the previous sensitivity analysis, versus
20.14%− 7.71% in the current one), given that when g = 20% there is also a much lower tax
rate and the private “industrial” sector manages to expand its labor force to about 60% of
the individuals from about 50% when g approaches 40%. Moreover, the standard deviation of
the unemployment rate does not largely change among simulations, always remaining about
2− 3%, and the inflation rate always remains between 1.4% and 2.1%.
9 Concluding remarks and future research
We present an agent-based macroeconomic model in which heterogeneous agents (individu-
als, firms and banks) interact according to a fully decentralized matching mechanism. The
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matching protocol is common to all markets (goods, labor, credit, deposits) and represents a
best partner choice in a context of imperfect information.
Model simulation shows that decentralized interactions among heterogeneous entities give
rise to emergent macroeconomic properties like the growth of nominal GDP, the fluctuation
of the unemployment rate, the presence of the Phillips curve, the relevance of leverage cycles
and credit constraints on economic performance, the presence of bank defaults and the role of
financial instability, and the importance of government in providing a fraction of the aggregate
demand and then as an acyclical sector which stabilize the economy. In particular, simulations
show that endogenous business cycles emerge as a consequence of the interaction between real
and financial factors: when firms’ profits are improving, they try to expand the production
and, if banks extend the required credit, this results in more employment; the decrease of the
unemployment rate leads to the rise of wages that, on the one hand, increases the aggregate
demand, while on the other hand reduces firms’ profits, and this may cause the inversion of
the business cycle, and then the recession is amplified by the deleveraging process.
Monte Carlo simulations show that model findings are quite robust. A particularly relevant
result is that a non-linear relation between firms leverage and unemployment emerges: for
relatively high levels of firms leverage the unemployment rate tends to be smaller and less
volatile. However, for largest values of the firms leverage the negative relation with the
unemployment rate tends to reverse. Also banks’ exposure and unemployment are non-linearly
related: for low levels, an increase of banks’ exposure reduces the rate of unemployment;
instead, for high levels of banks’ exposure a further increase makes the unemployment higher.
In other words, if banks increase their exposure enlarging credit to firms, the latter hire more
workers and the unemployment rate decreases. But, when the exposure of banks becomes
“excessive” this leads to instability (more failures) and an increase of the unemployment rate
follows. All in all, firms leverage and banks exposure may support the working of the economy
(reducing the unemployment rate), but when the levels of both leverage and exposure turn
to be excessive, the economy becomes too financially fragile (and unemployment may rise).
Moreover, model simulations highlight that even extended crises can endogenously emerge
with a strong reduction of real wages, a consequent fall of the aggregate demand that, in
turn, induces firms to decrease production, so enlarging the unemployment rate, in a vicious
positive feedback circle. In these cases, the system may remain trapped without the possibility
to spontaneously recover unless an exogenous intervention takes place.
Our modeling framework can be useful to understand the effects of some policy or insti-
tutional changes. Indeed, in future developments we will analyze the sensitivity of simulation
results to different parameter settings. Moreover, we will also investigate the consequences of
alternative assumptions such as the effect of fiscal and monetary policies, labor market rigid-
ity (in particular downward wage rigidity), heterogeneous consumption behavior, etc. Other
central features we want to introduce are an endogenous entry process (related to expected
profit), and a different timing for individual decision making (dissynchronization). Finally,
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the baseline model presented in this paper will be enriched by adding modules such as the
interbank market, the stock and bond markets (allowing agents to decide their portfolio al-
location), and long-run growth factors (investment goods, heterogeneous worker skills, R&D
investments, etc.).
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